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Abstract 
Inspired by Karl Polanyi’s writings on three allocation modes, namely reciprocity, exchange and 
redistribution, we first tested a reciprocity ring with ten players. The baseline treatment, with no 
possibility of socialisation, displayed very low levels of allocative efficiency. Consistently with the 
Polanyian  approach  to  reciprocity,  we  found  that  inducing  the  notion  of  symmetry  among  the 
players  increased  efficiency  levels  significantly.  We  then  simulated  a  market  exchange,  with 
significant  allocative  efficiency  gains.  We  conclude  that  indirect-reciprocity  rings  among 
anonymous  players  can  seldom  function  in  the  absence  of  definite  institutional  refinements, 
promoting forms of symmetry-acknowledgement.  
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“Further significant advance in economic history requires  
that we succeed in defining and explaining the different  
allocation systems that have characterised economic  
organisation  in the past five millennia. It was Karl  
Polanyi’s  intuitive genius that he saw the issues”  
(North, 1977: 715). 
 
Introduction 
The experimental investigation presented in this paper was inspired by an intuition, a permeating 
one in substantivist economic anthropology, that the institutional environment at large shapes individual 
decisions.  The  paradigmatic  proponent  of  such  an  approach  was  Karl  Polanyi  (1886-1964),  whose 
intuitions on three allocation modes in history form the theoretical starting point of our study.  
The  paper  is  organised  as  follows:  Section  1  briefly  discusses  Polanyi’s  writings  on  three 
allocation  systems,  and  illustrates  the  use  we  have  made  of  Polanyi’s  works  for  our  experimental 
investigation. The core idea is to test, in an artificial environment, the allocative efficiency of two of the 
three allocation modes described by Polanyi, i.e. reciprocity and market exchange, leaving aside for the 
moment  the  third,  namely  redistribution.  Section  2  discusses  the  experimental  literature  on  indirect 
reciprocity and illustrates the experimental design. Section 3 describes the results. Section 4 illustrates a 
market exchange game that we used as a comparative tool with respect to the reciprocity game. Final 
remarks follow.  
 
1.1 Notes on Polanyian economic anthropology 
The central contention of Karl Polanyi’s The Great Transformation (1944), as well as of later works, 
such as The Economy as Instituted Process (1957a), is that the market is an embedded form only in a 
peculiar period of time. In other historical periods, other allocation modes have prevailed, with market trades 
playing only a minor role. The “great transformation” started in England around 1750, and had a phase of 
backlash in Europe and America between the 1930’s and 1940’s. Such alleged decline of the institutions of 
capitalism in the period between the two World Wars can be explained in Polanyi’s interpretation as an   3 
example of failure of those institutional settings that are “disembedded” from the institutions of society at 
large (Smelser and Swedberg, 2005: 13).  
Polanyi’s approach to allocation systems is markedly substantivist,  that is to say,  “man's economy 
is,  as  a  rule,  submerged  in  his  social  relations”  (Polanyi,  1968a:  63-64).  Emphasis  is  laid  then  on  the 
institutional  matrix  within  which  individual  choices  occur,  with  an  explicit  denial  of  the  cross-cultural 
applicability  of  the  homo  oeconomicus  model,  the  latter  being  the  cornerstone  of  formalist  economic 
anthropology (Isaac, 2005: 19; Schneider, 1974: 9). 
Polanyi contends that Western European history, until the end of feudalism, and with the exception 
of the last centuries, has witnessed economies organised around principles that are far from self-interested: 
he refers to redistribution and reciprocity, or a combination of these two systems with market exchanges 
(Polanyi et al., 1957a: 294)
3. The three allocation modes are here shorthand notations for the mechanisms of 
integration of the processes of production and circulation of material goods within the wider society (Valensi 
and Godelier, 2003: 139). The qualifying elements of each circuit can be found in the way in which factors 
of production are organised. For instance, some traditional societies, like Melanesia, manage land and labour 
under social laws of kinship. The great empires of Hammurabi in Babylonia, and the New Kingdom of 
Egypt,  which  “were  centralised  despotisms  of  a  bureaucratic  type”,  on  the  other  hand,  depended  on 
redistribution of land and (slave) labour (Polanyi et al., 1957a: 312).  
It is in the behaviour of the Trobriand islanders, which Polanyi studied in Malinowski’s Argonauts of 
the Western Pacific (2004 [1922]), that Polanyi found the best instance of long-distance trades, concerning 
several objects, requiring several years of circulation and, arguably, entirely based on the norm of reciprocity 
(Valensi and Godelier, 2003: 131). We shall return to the peculiarities of the Trobriand economy later on in 
this essay.  
A necessary terminological distinction should  be drawn between trades and (market) exchanges, a 
distinction that makes sense only if we extend the concept of trade beyond the narrow logic of markets. In 
this sense, in Polanyi’s works, we find three different types of trade: gift trade, administered trade, and 
market trade (Polanyi et al., 1957a: 262): 
                                                
3 Together with reciprocity, redistribution and exchange, the Great Transformation describes also a fourth allocation system, the 
household economy (instances of which are manorial estates and subsistence smallholdings). This allocation mode shares important 
features with Aristotle’s analysis of oikonomia. In the essay, The Economy as Instituted Process, this allocation system is practically 
dropped, as it can be subsumed into an example of a redistribution system among members of groups of reduced dimension, under a 
regime of autarchy.    4 
 
“Gift trade links the partners in relationships of reciprocity, such as: guest friends, Kula partners, visiting 
parties. Over millennia trade between empires was carried on as gift trade […]. The organisation of trade is 
usually ceremonial, involving mutual presentation” (Polanyi et al., 1957a: 262).    
 
At a certain point of modern history, trade came to be coextensive with the concept of market, overturning 
the historical tradition which saw trades taking place mainly under gift-like trading arrangements, Polanyi 
argues. Formalist anthropologists, however, in interpreting the same sources that Polanyi referred to, above 
all Malinowski (2004 [1922]) and Thurnwald (1969 [1932]), highlighted that these tribal economies share 
important features with economic systems of later stages of economic history. In light of this interpretation, 
the calculation on the fit between means and ends is common to all societies (Schneider, 1974). Polanyi 
strongly opposed this view, claiming that looking for economising behaviour in traditional societies would 
mean misinterpreting their functioning. An entirely different set of concepts is needed to interpret these 
economies: reciprocity and redistribution above all, and the substantive meaning of the word “economy”, 
stressing satisfaction of both material wants and social needs, rather than formal microeconomic calculation 
based on the notion of scarcity (Dalton, 1990: 165; Polanyi, 1957a: 243).  
One may wonder, at this stage, how formal economic concepts can fit  within a theory stressing the 
organic link between economy and the social matrix within which the economy is embedded. Our attempt is 
to reproduce in a laboratory two institutional arrangements that can replicate, in a satisfactory fashion, two of 
the three allocation modes described by Polanyi. In a (controlled) laboratory environment, it is possible to 
introduce such refinements, suggested by the anthropological theory itself, which can favour coordination 
levels  among  the  players. The formal  economics  concept  we  referred  to above, is  allocative efficiency. 
Throughout this essay, this is defined as the ratio of the sum of the actual gains of the players in the game, to 
the potentially attainable gains if optimal behaviour takes place (cf. e.g. Gode and Sunder, 1997). We have 
attempted to show that, while a market exchange setting can function well even in the absence of forms of 
induced socialisation, forms of induced symmetry need to be in place in order that  gift-trade arrangements 
work.    5 
  A noteworthy attempt to carry out a comparative institutional analysis, based on instruments arising 
from Polanyi’s theoretical apparatus, has been carried out by Douglass C. North. After recognising that 
“Polanyi was correct in his major contention that the nineteenth century was a unique era in which markets 
played a more important role than at any other time in history” (North, 1977: 706), he proposes a choice of 
the different modes of allocation based on the notion of transaction costs. In this approach, “reciprocity 
societies  can  be  considered  as  a  least-cost  trading  solution  where  no  system  of  enforcing  the  terms  of 
exchange between trading units exists” (1977: 713). In this sense, social norms underpinning gift-trades, i.e. 
the triple obligation to make gifts, accept them and give them back (cf. Mauss, 2002 [1924]), make such a 
system self-enforcing and capable of supporting complex trades among subjects and communities. In the 
approach that goes back to Malinowski and Mauss, gifts, unlike commodities, are never fully alienated from 
the giver, but give rise to reciprocal obligations, a feature which keeps (gift- and non-gift-) trades  alive and 
frequent among the traders.  
This peculiarity of gift-trade is best exemplified by Malinowski’s description of kula-trade, which 
we  hinted  at  above.  Malinowski  observed  this  complex  ceremonial  practice  during  his  journeys  in  the 
Trobriand islands, an archipelago off the coast of Papua New Guinea
4. In the interpretation given by Polanyi 
(1968b: 12), the kula-ring is one of the “most elaborate trading transactions known to man”, and it is centred 
on the act of giving as valuable in itself, without the need for any formalistic reasoning: 
 
 “Trobriand economy […] is organised as a continuous give-and-take, yet there is no possibility of setting up 
a  balance,  or  of  employing  a  the  concept  of  a  fund.  Reciprocity  demands  adequacy  of  response,  not 
mathematical equality” (Polanyi et al., 1957a: 273).  
 
In the interpretation of Singh Uberoi (1971), however, in the Trobriandese economy, exchanges of gifts 
create the conditions for exchange of acts of duty and support, both material and nonmaterial in nature. 
Therefore, according to this  interpretation, the kula is not a purely ceremonial practice, but is imbued with 
an element of formalistic reasoning, which has  probably been under-explored in Malinowski’s Argonauts 
                                                
4 The influence that such a practice has gained in the modern theory of reciprocity is great, to the point that Lévi-Strauss (1965: 
xxxvii) claimed that the Melanesian people are the true authors of the modern theory of reciprocity.   6 
(Singh Uberoi, 1971: 148;  cf. however, Malinowski’s remarks on pp. 105-106). The next section looks in 
great detail at Polanyi’s three forms of integration of the economy into society. 
 
1.2 Reciprocity, exchange and redistribution  
 
In a key passage of the essay The Economy as Instituted Process, Polanyi claims: 
 
“Reciprocity  denotes  movements  between  correlative  points  of  symmetrical  groupings;  redistribution 
designates appropriational movements toward a center and out of it again; exchange refers here to vice-versa 
movements  taking  place  as  between  “hands”  under  a  market  system.  Reciprocity,  then,  assumes  for  a 
background  symmetrically  arranged  groupings;  redistribution  is  dependent  upon  the  presence  of  some 
measure of centricity in the group; exchange in order to produced integration requires a system of price-
making markets” (Polanyi et al., 1957a: 250). 
 
Reciprocity  can  be  essentially  of  two  types:  direct,  whenever  the  parties  are  involved  in  a  mutual 
presentation; indirect, whenever the original trusting act, and the reciprocity obligation arising from it, do not 
necessarily involve the same actors.  
The second type of reciprocity is typical of the Trobriandese social organisation and, more precisely, 
it is embodied in the kula trade itself. The kula  objects (“vaygu’a”, in the Trobriandese language) are 
essentially of two types: bracelets (“mwali”) or necklaces (“soulava”), both made of common seashells and 
therefore  apparently  lacking  in  any  intrinsic  value.  To  exchange  with  someone  else  a  vaygu’a  seems 
intuitively a costless activity, void of any strict economic significance. On closer inspection, however, the 
kula trade appears  to attribute a symbolic value to each specific vaygu’a. The kula trade can, in fact, deeply 
modify the value of a vaygu’a, overshadowing its aesthetic features. Indeed, either a mwali or a soulava can 
be considered by the natives as very “beautiful” or “banally common”, and therefore more or less valuable. 
When a vaygu’a has become very old, which means that it has passed through the kula circle many times, it 
gains an intrinsic value which completely prevails over any aesthetic consideration. This means that when 
someone decides to exchange a very old and important vaygu’a, he is consciously cooperating in favour of   7 
the whole community of the kula circle. In other words, he is indirectly returning the favour previously 
received from the community which allowed him – even if for a limited time – to benefit from the honour of 
having had a transitory possession of such a valuable object.  
Furthermore, we wish to contend that the indirect reciprocity mechanism that takes place within the 
kula circle, requires some form of balance in the interpersonal relationships. In practice, this means that two 
specific agents who start an interaction within the kula circle must share an almost identical hierarchical 
status.  Hierarchical statuses that are too distant from each other  prevent any potential trade, and, typically, 
each person belonging to the kula has a sort of “portfolio” of partners who are his privileged counterparts in 
the exchange of the vaygu’a. 
What should be retained of this analysis is that reciprocity need not be direct: rather, there can exist a 
motional  process  of  generalised  trades  resting  on  the  presence  of  symmetrically  organised  groupings 
(Polanyi  et  al.  1957a:  253).  The  importance  of  indirect  reciprocity  for  the  development  of  large-scale 
cooperation systems has been stressed by, among others,  Alexander (1984: 85-93) and Yamagishi (2002), . 
The latter claims that “complex human societies would be impossible to maintain if humans relied solely on 
direct exchanges between particular partners” (p. 17). This is so, because generalised reciprocity exempts the 
parties from costs due to the establishment of a specific relationship. This explains our emphasis on indirect 
generalised reciprocity. In a socio-economic arrangement based on this norm, the parties contribute, in the 
reasonable expectation that “someone” will do the same to her/him in the case she/he  plays the role of the 
weak party.  
  Polanyi  describes  at  length  how  reciprocity  and  redistribution  are  supported  by  peculiar  social 
norms, which have been effectively summarised by George Dalton (Table 1).  
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
Market exchanges are different from the other transactional modes in that they are not expressions of any 
social obligation or principle: a market exchange is in fact “disembedded” from the “social matrix” (Isaac, 
2005: 14), because it is intrinsically an expression of a formalist logic. Polanyi clearly states that the forms of 
integration he describes cannot be considered as projections of personal attitudes at an aggregate level. With   8 
reference  to  reciprocity  and  redistribution,  the  presence  of  well-identified  social  norms,  respectively 
symmetry and centricity, is necessary in order to produce integration. For example: 
 
“reciprocity  behaviour  between  individuals  integrates  the  economy  only  if  symmetrically  organised 
structures, such as symmetrical system of kinship groups, are given. But a kinship system never arises as 
the result of mere reciprocating behaviour on the personal level. Similarly, in regard to redistribution. It 
presupposes the presence of an allocative center in the community, yet the organisation and validation of 
such a center does not come about merely  as  a  consequence of frequent acts  of sharing as between 
individuals” (Polanyi et al., 1957a: 251).  
 
Polanyi  predicted  that  only  in  symmetrically  organised  groupings  will  reciprocative  behaviour  result  in 
economic institutions of some historical and anthropological importance. Similarly, only where there exists 
an allocation system organised around some authority-holder, will we observe a redistributive economy. In 
short, “the societal effects of individual behaviour depend on the presence of definite institutional conditions; 
these conditions do not for that reason result from the personal behaviour in question” (Polanyi et al., 1957a: 
251).  
  After this introduction to Polanyi’s works, we now come to the experimental part of our paper. 
Our attempt is to give a contribution to the theory of comparative institutional analysis, using as a starting 
point the three allocation modes described by Polanyi.  
 
2. Reciprocity: the experimental literature 
The game we devised in order to replicate a reciprocity ring shares important features with both 
the Investment Game
5 (Berg et al., 1995) and the Centipede Game
6 (Rosenthal, 1981; McKelvey and 
                                                
5 This game was replicated with a number of refinements. For a survey of the literature on the game, cf. Dickhaut and Rustichini 
(2001).  
6 In the centipede game, originally played with two players only, the players alternatively obtain access to a larger share of a 
continuously increasing accumulation of points. Subgame perfection dictates that the game should end immediately in the fear of 
opportunistic behaviour at later stages. However, experimental studies on this game provide very different results: in a six-move   9 
Palfrey, 1992), and has been studied in similar forms by Greiner and Levati (2005). In Greiner and Levati, 
player i is aware of the choices of player i-1, but is unaware of the past histories of reciprocity of the 
players before i-1, and is similarly unaware of the future investment decisions. The Investment Game 
devised by Berg et al. (1995) is then rearranged within a ring of n players. Each player i can receive an 
investment from player i-1, and is free to choose the points to send forward to i+1. The last player is free 
to choose how much to return to player 1, a choice which ends the game. At each transfer of points from 
one player to the other, the amount  is multiplied by three, a feature which renders cooperation beneficial.  
The hypothesis that the authors wish to test is whether the cooperative attitude of the players 
monotonically  increases  with  that  of  third  parties.  The  authors  test  their  results  for  group  size  by 
comparing 3- and 6-person rings. They repeat the game with the same players for a finite number of 
times, varying the rematching procedure. They test in particular a partner’s condition (whereby  it is the 
same group that interacts ten times), and a stranger’s condition (groups are randomly formed after each 
round). In their experiments, they find that the average amount sent is positive for both partners and 
strangers, contrary  to the game theoretic prediction. The average amount sent, however, is significantly 
higher for partners. The authors conclude that strategic reputation-building, indeed,  plays a role in an 
indirect-reciprocity game. Furthermore, the 3-person groups tend to have higher average gifts than those 
observed in 6-person groups. Such a result is consistent with the argument by Boyd and Richerson (1989) 
that indirect reciprocity is likely to be effective in the case of small and close groups, in which the peers 
meet frequently. 
  In Greiner and Levati (2005), the authors created a full homogeneity of the initial conditions, 
assigning the same endowment to all players. By  assigning the same endowment to all players, we aim at 
preventing potentially confounding “inequity aversion” effects. As we shall see, our game differs, in this 
regard, from Greiner and Levati’s, as only the first player is endowed with a small amount of points, 
which gets multiplied as the points pass from one person to the other. In our experiment, moreover, the 
initial amount of points available to player number 1 was kept low, and this made it profitable for the first 
                                                                                                                                                            
centipede  game,  McKelvey  and Palfrey  (1992) report  that  only in  37  of  662  games,  do  the  players choose  to  close  the game 
immediately. 23 games arrive at the end of the centipede. The remaining games lie  between these two extremes.  
   10 
player(s) to “trust”, as the amount they could earn in the case in which trust prevailed consistently, was 
significantly greater than the payoff they would have earned, had they withheld the initial endowment (16 
or 28 euro cents). As a result of the way the game is structured, the first player had to trust eight players 
(the tenth being a dummy player). In the case in which each player sent everything, her final payoff 
would have been   more than 50 times the initial amount she had available.  For the first player, the 
decision to trust is, therefore, both risky and profitable. The event that the first player sends a substantial 
amount of points to player number 2, who takes a similar decision vis-à-vis player number 3, is therefore 
crucially linked to her estimation of the probability of generalised exchanges taking place after her: 
 
“a donor provides help if the recipient is likely to help others (which often means, if the recipient has 
helped others in the past). In this case, it pays to advertise cooperation, as the cost of an altruistic act is 
offset by an increased chance to become the recipient of an altruistic act later” (Nowak and Sigmund, 
1998: 573).  
 
We would like to test the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: in the absence of forms of induced symmetry, the game reaches insignificant levels of 
allocative efficiency.  
 
In other words, if the experimental design is perceived by the players as a game of gift-trades, then we 
should  observe  high  levels  of  allocative  efficiency.  This,  however,  will  require  definite  institutional 
refinements. The  structure of the game implies, in fact, that player nine will be  strongly tempted to 
behave opportunistically, since she has a very relevant amount of points if all previous players have sent 
all their endowment.  
Thus, the decision problem involves both an element of trust, as outlined above, and an element 
of coordination, namely the requirement  that all players deem  a cooperative type of rationality as crucial.  
 
   11 
3. The experimental design 
3.1 PILOT EXPERIMENT 
We tested a modified version of the game studied by Greiner and Levati in a pilot experiment we 
ran in December 2006. We randomly formed six cohorts of ten players, who voluntarily accepted to take 
part in the experiment after a public announcement. The subjects were all University of Trento students. 
The experiment took place at the Computable and Experimental Economics Laboratory (CEEL) of the 
University of Trento, and was entirely computer-based. After the reading of the instructions, the game 
started with a simple question meant to ascertain whether the essential features of the game were clear (“if 
you have 10 points, and you decide to send 5 to the next player, how much will she have available?”). 
Questions posed by the participants regarding general aspects of the game were answered publicly. The 
game  works  as  follows:  the  first  player  has  a  very  limited  endowment  of  points  (16  euro  cents  in 
Treatment 1, and 28 in Treatment 2
7). The number of players and the constant multiplier were common 
knowledge.  The  players  were  not  informed  about  the  amount  of  points  available  to  previous  or 
subsequent players. The order of play was random and all the choices were anonymous. The first player 
decides the amount to withhold out of the endowment, and the amount to be sent to a generic “next 
player”. The amount being sent is multiplied by a factor 2 by the experimenter. Player number 2 made a 
similar decision, with the multiplication of points taking place at each gift-decision of the players. In our 
experiment, player 10 is only a dummy player, as the amount that reaches him is divided equally among 
all the group-members. The final payoff of the players was calculated as the sum of the points they 
decided to withhold, and of the points that reached player number 10, divided by 10. At the end of the 
experiment, the points gained were converted into euros, with one experimental point being equivalent to 
one eurocent.  
Figure 1 illustrates a reduced version of this sequential game, with the only choices being to 
“send ahead the whole endowment” or “withhold the whole endowment”. 
 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
 
                                                
7 All subjects were paid a show up-fee of 2 euros.    12 
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6931 . 0 5 . 0 = , and   is the number of the node of the 
game,  which  is  equal  to  ten  in  the  case  in  which  the  game  arrives  at  its  final  stage.  Given  that 
x e
x e
) 5 . 0 (
10
) 5 . 0 ( 9 * 6931 . 0
10 * 6931 . 0
> , player 9 will have an incentive to defect before the last round. Subgame 
perfection dictates that, as in a standard centipede game, player 1 closes the game immediately, and 
pockets his initial endowment. Consequently, all other players gain nothing.    
  In  the  pilot  experiment,  players  were  subject  to  severe  information  conditions,  as  they  were 
unaware of the endowment of previous players. No information was given on the image score of the 
recipient either. In this pilot experiment we tried to limit player opportunism by limiting the maximum 
amount payable to 25 euros.  
Our game tries to mimic imperfectly a kula-ring type of arrangement, the major difference being 
that in our game each agent plays only once while the Trobriandese economy described by Malinowski is 
based on a continuous give-and-take with the local neighbour. We introduced this variant in order to 
model one of the most interesting characteristics of the kula trade, i.e. the generation of idiosyncratic non-
tradable value embodied in a given vaygu’a which has passed through many “cycles” of exchange.  
Generally speaking, our game shares some features with a generic productive process, in which 
the value of the commodity increases with the number of people who have taken a decision regarding it. 
At the end of the process, all participants typically share profits.  
The results of the pilot experiment confirm in two cases (Group 1 and 2, Tr. 1) the game’s 
theoretic prediction that player 1 will not send anything. In group 5 (Tr. 2), the game stopped at the 
second round. Group 3 (Tr. 1) and 4 (Tr. 2) stopped at round number 5. Finally, Group 6 (Tr. 2) was the 
only one in which all players took a decision, but with an insignificant redistribution of 8 points.  
Two  features,  in  particular,  of  our  game  seem  to  have  undermined  any  cooperative  attempt. 
Firstly, ignorance about the endowment of previous players probably led the decision-maker to end the 
game (by sending zero), as she likely thought that in previous rounds players had large sums available, 
and had decided to send very little ahead. As a matter of fact, however, the first players had a very limited 
amount of points. Spiteful behaviour seems, therefore, to have set in,  in those sessions that have gone   13 
beyond stage 1 of the game. Secondly, there seems to be a computational failure on the part of the players 




points, in the case everyone sent 
everything, with x being the endowment of player 1).  
By means of a series of amendments to the rules of the game, we have tried to take these criticalities into 
account.  
 
3.2. THE BASELINE EXPERIMENT  
In our baseline experiment, the subjects
8 (eight cohorts of ten players) played a game that functioned in the 
same way as our pilot experiment, with the following differences: 
a.  Payable-amount thresholds were removed; 
b.  There was common knowledge
9 about the number of points players could have gained in the case in 
which all players sent ahead all the points they had available. Faced with the challenge of easing a 
computational failure, we have made the information available in order to avoid the possibility that 
some players did not acquire this crucial datum.  
c.  It was common knowledge that the first player had to send a strictly positive number of points. With 
this, we tried to promote the willingness of the first player, who has no previous history to refer to, to 
send points.   
d.  The players could no longer send zero. Denoting with  g  the amount that could be sent, and with E  
the endowment of points,  . Still, the players could choose to adopt a smallest-granularity 
consignment decision, i.e. sending ahead 1 point only.  
e.  A further, distinct option was given to players number 2 to 9 (player 10, as usual, did not have any 
choice to make): such players could decide to end the experiment. In this case, the amount that the 
player has available is divided into equal shares between himself and all the previous players, with 
the subsequent players obtaining zero.  
                                                
8 Subjects who took part in the December sessions were not allowed to participate in this new experiment. No player has played any 
of our reciprocity experimental sessions twice.         
9 The instructions for the baseline experiment are reported in Appendix 1.    14 
f.  Finally, when the players had to make their decision, they could see on the screen the number of 
points that on average the previous players had available. Player number 2 saw exactly the amount 
of points that player 1 had available.  
  The new set of rules changed the Nash equilibrium of the game. In fact, it is  no longer possible to 
send zero, and closing is unappealing for all players but player 2, who would be indifferent between closing 
the game and sending 1 point to the third player, in the case he has the smallest possible endowment (2 
points). For all other players, the subgame perfect decision is to keep all the amount available and send one 
point
10 to the next player. This was a necessary refinement in order to observe the choices of all players, 
thereby preventing the unsatisfactory event in which a player closes the game at the very beginning, making 
it impossible to observe how the other players would have behaved in their turn.  
 
3.2.1 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
With the exception of one session (with Tr. 1), the game always arrived  at the redistributive stage. 
The points accumulated are, however, very modest. Figure 2 shows the paths of the average (mean) gift-
decisions in Treatment 1 and Treatment 2 (4 sessions each), in absolute terms.   
 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
 
The figure shows that transfers are systematically higher in Tr. 2 sessions. Figure 3 shows the gift-decisions 
as a percentage of the sum players had available.  
 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
 
Figure  3  shows  that  gift-decisions  tend  to  be    highly  cyclical,  i.e.  that  their  shape  resembles  a 
trigonometric function: decisions to send a consistent share of the available sum are, in fact, followed by 
decisions  to  withhold  most  of  the  amount  available,  and  vice  versa.  Somehow,  higher  payoffs  are 
                                                
10 In fact, this is the smallest granularity that it is possible to send.    15 
concentrated at the end of the decisional chain, and can be observed only in Tr. 2 sessions, as shown in 
Figure 4. 
 
Insert Figure 4 about here 
 
The amounts earned are still very low, given the exchange rate of 1 experimental point to one euro cent. As a 
matter of fact, redistribution has been  mostly inconsistent: the maximum amount of points that reached 
player number 10 was 288. This has determined very low levels of allocative efficiency: 1% on average, with 
statistically significant differences across the two treatments (two-sample Mann-Whitney test, prob> |Z| = 
0.026).  Thus,  hypothesis  1  is    verified.  Furthermore,  38%  of  the  subjects  played  the  Nash  equilibrium 
strategy to send one point only.  
Using as a dependent variable the absolute amount of points sent by the players, a linear regression 
has been carried out to check the following model: 
 
                                                          ( ) ε , , , , , , GE O G F E Y f M g =                                                  [1] 
 
Where: 
Mg =  players i’s transfer to player i+1; 
Y = endowment of player i. 
 
The following covariates are based on answers to the debriefing survey, which will be discussed in greater 
detail in § 3.2.2: 
E = expectancy to receive back more (or less) than the amount given (dummy variable; more = 0; less = 1); 
F  [ ] 100 ..., , 0 ∈ = the player’s conception of a fair transfer; 
G = gender (dummy variable; male = 1; female = 0); 
O = the player’s expectation about opportunistic behaviour taking place at stage 9 of the game (dummy 
variable; yes = 1; no = 0);   16 
GE = this dummy captures the player’s motivation in gift-exchanges, as approximated by the expectation of 
a return in a precise span of time (=1) or gratuity (= 2); 
ε = stochastic error.  
 
The hypothesis we wish to test through this specification is that Mg is influenced positively by Y and F, and 
by expectancies of different types, and by gender. The purported existence of a positive correlation between 
endowment  and  money  given  is  not  trivial,  since  a  higher  endowment  could  also  have  increased  the 
opportunity cost of reciprocative behaviour, thereby increasing opportunism. Our regression model (r
2 = 
0.729, F = 28.3, df = 6) yields a positive and significant correlation between the dependent variable and the 
endowment  (p-value=  0.000),  and  their  conception  of  fairness  in  gift-giving  (p-value:  0.002).  Other 
covariates are positively but insignificantly correlated with the regressand. 
Ceteris paribus, but using as dependent variable the gift  as a percentage of the endowment, the 
correlation between endowment and the dependent variable is no longer statistically significant (p-value = 
0.601), and the regression model loses part of its explicatory power (r
2 = 0.483). On the other hand, the 
player’s  conception  of  fairness  remains  significantly  correlated  with  the  dependent  variable  (p-value  = 
0.000).  
Thus, players seem  to have an “ideal percentage figure” in mind, resulting from  their own 
conception of a fair transfer. It seems that this rule of thumb is applied, regardless of the endowment. This 
consideration is supported by the significance of the covariate F in both regressions above.  
 
3.2.2. ANALYSIS OF THE ANSWERS TO THE DEBRIEFING SURVEY 
At the end of the experiment, but before being informed of their payoffs, the subjects were asked to 
answer some debriefing questions
11, which allow us to understand more fully the players’ approach to the 
decision-problem. In our analysis, we took into account only the answers to the debriefing of the players who 
made a choice, i.e. from round 1 to 9, excluding also the only player who closed a game ( ) 71 = n . The first 
question asked was whether the players expected to receive back more, or less, than the amount they sent 
(variable E of our regression models): 64% of the subjects gave a positive answer. This shows clearly their 
                                                
11 A translation of the debriefing survey is reported in Appendix 2.    17 
reliance  on  the  consignment  decisions  of  the  others.  The  second  question  tried  to  elicit  the  players’ 
conception of fairness, by asking them what was the fair share they deemed they should send to the next 
player (variable F). The median here is 50%, with a mean value of 59%. Hence, players’ perception of 
fairness dictates that about half of the endowment should be sent to the next player, contrary to both the 
Pareto-efficient and the game-theoretic predictions.   
Furthermore, we thought it useful to check whether this fair share that the players reported in the 
debriefing, mirrored  the choices  that  the  players made  during the  game. To  this end, we  compared the 
percentage  of  the  available  sum  that  the  players  sent,  and  their  answer  to  question  number  2  of  the 
debriefing. Using a  ± 10% interval, 58% of the players passed this coherency test. Using a  ± 20% interval, 
the figure rose to 72%. Therefore, the majority of the players seems to have followed a “fair share” rule, 
which they consistently expressed in the debriefing question, whose aim was to catch this particular aspect.  
In the third question,  the subjects were told to imagine that they were the first player, and then they 
were asked whether their choice of the points to be withheld would have changed, had they  been the ninth 
player, in lieu of the first (variable O): 68% of the subjects gave a positive answer to the question. Hence, 
players understood correctly that the way the game was structured implied that the ninth player’s trust-
decision was more demanding than the first player’s, an expectancy that probably discouraged all players 
from  sending  points,  if  they  foresaw  that  opportunistic  behaviour  would  have  prevailed  at  stage  9. 
Furthermore, the great  majority  of the players declares  that  gratuity,  and  not reciprocity  considerations, 
motivates them in gift-making (87.5%). The sample was balanced as to gender (52% of males, 48% of 
females).  
 
3.2.3 DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
A possible line of criticism is that a multiplier of 2 was not large enough to offset the risks involved 
in cooperating. In this sense, a larger multiplier would have probably promoted their willingness to send 
points. This line of reasoning is suggested by Van Huyck et al. (1995), where the authors used a game not 
dissimilar from Berg’s investment game, with the result that the investors’ willingness to trust increases as 
the  multiplier  becomes  larger.  Secondly,  it  may  be  that  our  game  lacked  the  Polanyian  attributes  of 
symmetry, or, in other words, that our laboratory environment favoured a game-theoretic approach, rather   18 
than a gift-exchange one, to the decision problem, which in turn did not favour the diffusion of trust. As we 
shall    see  later,  we  have  made  a  (rather  conservative)  attempt  in  this  sense  by  allowing  players  to 
communicate before playing the game. We would like to point out, however, that different solutions, such as 
introducing the consumption of relational goods, or an ad hoc choice of participants in the experiment (such 
as volunteers of a not-for-profit organisation), are conceivable too.  
 
3.4 THE GAME WITH A PRE-PLAY COMMUNICATION STAGE 
Through this variant with respect to the baseline, we tried to raise the sense of belonging of the 
players
13 to a symmetrical grouping via a stage of pre-play communication (cheap talk). Our hypothesis is 
that: 
 
Hypothesis 2: the pre-play communication stage promotes the allocative efficiency of the circuit, by slightly 
raising  the percentage of the endowment transferred to the next player.  
 
Cheap  talk  has  been  defined  by  Farrell  and  Rabin  (1996:  116)  as  “costless,  nonbinding,  nonverifiable 
messages that may affect the listener’s beliefs”. The authors point out that in an incomplete information 
game,  in  which  each  player  can  be  of  several  types  (in  our  example,  a  reciprocative  type,  and  an  un-
reciprocative one), allowing the players to communicate can serve as a way to map the type of the other 
players, if all the players share a correlation between their true type and their preference towards the others’ 
beliefs about one’s own type (Farrell and Rabin, 1996: 106).  Accordingly, after reading  the instructions and 
before the start of the game, we asked the experimental subjects to discuss three questions included in the 
instructions for five minutes. The experimenters were not present during the discussion, and communications 
were not recorded, as we believe that recording would have produced undesirable confounds the verbal 
behaviour of the subjects.. The questions were the following: 
 
                                                
13 We selected four cohorts of ten students each. The instructions (reported in Appendix 3) were analogous to the ones of the baseline 
sessions, with an add-up in which topics-for-discussion for the pre-play stage were provided. The PPC sessions were all conducted 
with treatment 1, i.e. with 16 points available to the first player.    19 
1. according to you, if all the players send half of the sum they have available, how much will all participants 
win?  
With this question, we wanted to prompt reasoning by the player as to the benefits arising from sending all 
the amount of points they had available.  
 
2) do you think that the introduction of a rule of behaviour among yourselves could be helpful in order to 
raise the payoffs of all participants?  
This question was meant to elicit the possibility of a shared pact among the players, thanks to which a 
Pareto-efficient outcome could be achieved.  
 
3) do you think that this rule of behaviour that you have just discussed will be used by the players during the 
game? I would like to remind you that your choices will be anonymous and free.  
With this question, the  players were asked to discuss about issues of compliance with the rule they had 
considered, the most simple and salient of which is that all players send all the amount available, provided 
that the communication stage was not binding
14. This question was also meant to prompt reasoning about the 
unequal positioning of the players, given that, if all players sent the whole amount available, player number 9 
would have had a relevant sum at her disposal (about 40 euros). Since the players were discussing behind a 
veil of ignorance, i.e. they were unaware of their positioning within the game (the result of a choice of 
Nature), this question was meant to raise the awareness that all players faced a common weakness, arising 
from the problem of compliance with the agreed-upon rule of behaviour of those playing in the final part of 
the decisional chain. We have thus used these topics-for-discussion in order to raise the consciousness of a 
substantially homogeneous grouping, as all players at this stage shared a common condition of weakness. 
Homogeneity can be thought of as a proxy for the Polanyian notion of symmetry. As we have seen, Polanyi 
predicted that only in symmetrically organised groupings, will reciprocative behaviour result in economic 
institutions of some historical and anthropological importance.  
A glimpse at the gift-decisions of the players confirms our hypothesis about the effectiveness of 
cheap-talk (Figure 6).  
                                                
14 Cf. in this regard, the remarks in Bicchieri (2005: 199) about informing subjects that agreements are non-binding.    20 
 
 
Insert Figure 6 about here 
 
Figure 7 shows the gift-decisions of the players as a percentage of their endowment.  
 
Insert Figure 7 about here 
 
The average allocative efficiency is 28%, versus 1% of the baseline experiment with treatment 1. Players 
pass, on average, their whole endowment (median: 100%). Hypothesis 3 is hence verified. Payoffs earned are 
shown in Figure 8.   
 
Insert Figure 8 about here 
 
Non-parametric tests between the pre-play communication sessions and the baseline sessions (Tr. 1), 
show us that the figures of the allocative efficiency, the percentage gift, and the payoffs earned, are all 
statistically different across the two samples (two sample Mann-Whitney test, prob> |Z| = 0.000, in all tests). 
Finally, no player followed the Nash equilibrium strategy of sending only one point.  
 
3.4.1 ANALYSIS OF THE DEBRIEFING 
In the debriefing survey, subjects report that the fair share to send ahead is 100% (median, mean: 
78%). Furthermore, they are usually consistent with their choices (58 % with ±10% interval, 66% with ± 
20%).  Moreover,  84%  of  the  subjects  believe  that  the  initial  (pre-play)  communication  was  useful  in 
promoting the willingness to send points. Finally, the pre-play communication stage resulted in a decrease in 
the number of potential opportunists at stage 9 of the game: the figure drops to 55%, in contrast to 68% of 
the  baseline  treatment.  Differences  across  the  two  samples  are,  however,  statistically  insignificant  (two 
sample Mann-Whitney test, prob> |Z| = 0.22).  
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4. Exchange 
4.1 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND RESULTS 
Our exchange experiment is designed as a bargaining game in which the sellers (5 per session) take two 
distinct decisions: 
1.  the amount to place “on the market”, knowing that this amount will be multiplied by a factor 2 by 
the experimenter; 
2.  a proposed division of the multiplied amount of points
15.  
Five buyers view the offers as they are formulated, knowing that they have four rounds available, that they 
can conclude one single transaction, and that they have to accept one offer in order to earn a strictly positive 
payoff. Similarly, sellers need to formulate a successful offer, in order that the points they have withheld and 
the part of the offer they have assigned to themselves,  be converted into  euros at the end of the experiment.  
A possible criticism of such an experimental setting, is that the interaction-structure is so different 
from the reciprocity-ring that allocative-efficiency comparisons are meaningless. We believe, however, that 
the structures of market exchanges are best approximated as a bilateral exchange among anonymous players, 
where several offers are competing on the market. On the other hand, generalised systems of reciprocity, 
prototypically the Trobriand economy, are best mimicked as a continuous give-and-take, although the final 
redistribution  of  resources,  which  we  have  introduced  in  our  reciprocity  game,  is  a  feature  which  is 
extraneous to the kula-trade arrangement.  
Returning to the experimental design, we have studied two different treatments. In one treatment 
(four sessions), there was common knowledge that buyers saw on their screen the amount  initially available 
to sellers (from now on, FI tr., for “full-information treatment”). Thus, in this case buyers could form a 
preference for equitable offers. In the second treatment (four sessions), such information was removed, so 
that sellers were uncertain about the information package available to buyers (they only knew that buyers 
would have seen their “offers”), and buyers saw on their screen only the amount of points offered to them by 
each seller, without any further information (from now on, NI tr., “no-information treatment”). The game- 
theoretic prediction for this game is straightforward, assuming no time-discounting by the contractors: sellers 
will always place the whole endowment E on the market, in order to decide a division over 2E, and offer 
                                                
15 The instructions for the market exchange experiment are reported in Appendix 4.    22 
throughout the rounds the smallest granularity possible ε  to buyers, an offer which is accepted by buyers 
given that  . 0 > ε  
Figure 9 shows that the great majority of transactions have been concluded immediately. There was 
only one case in which a couple of players did not manage to conclude a transaction, with the buyer not 
accepting the proposed offer at round 4.  
 
 
Insert Figure 9 about here 
 
 
The  average  allocative  efficiency  of  the  market  exchange  game  is  75%,  regardless  of  the  information 
package available to buyers (two sample Mann-Whitney test, prob> |Z| = 0.738). It should be pointed out that 
the initial endowment of points was designed in such a way that, if sellers decided not to withhold points 
initially, and if they divided the amount in equal parts, then all players would have earned the same amount 
of points that players in the reciprocity game (Tr. 1) could have earned, had all players sent ahead the whole 
endowment. 
It is then interesting to look at the distance of buyers’ and sellers’ median payoff from the equitable 
and Pareto-optimal division of the sum (820 points for both players). Experimental data show that such a 
figure is zero for sellers, whose median payoff is exactly 820 points, across the two treatments. Buyers, on 
the  other  hand,  have  gained  a  payoff  that  is  located  about  50%  below  the  equitable  threshold,  with 
insignificant differences across the two treatments (two sample Mann-Whitney test, prob> |Z| = 0.883). With 
reference to the accepted bids, sellers propose to buyers on average (median) 50% of the amount on the 
market but, given that they usually withhold points (the average amount of points on the market is 48% of 
the endowment), this results in a divider’s advantage accruing to sellers, as we have seen above. 
The rules of the game, based on bilateral interaction between one random buyer and one random 
seller,  seem  to  have  favoured  the  allocative  efficiency  of  the  experimental  setting,  irrespective  of  the 
information package available to buyers.  
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4.2 THE DEBRIEFING SURVEY 
In order to gain insight into the players’ strategies, we asked them to answer a debriefing survey 
contingent upon their specific role within the game (buyer or seller)
16. Sellers are usually confident about 
their choices: in most cases, they would have accepted as a buyer the offer they have formulated as a seller 
(80% in the FI tr., 90% in the NI tr.). The perception of fairness, however, changes. In the FI tr., 90% of the 
sellers state that they think they were fair to the buyers. In the NI tr., however, 65% of the sellers answer 
negatively,  showing  that  sellers  have  presumably  taken  advantage  of  the  lack  of  a  crucial  piece  of 
information, in order to make what they deemed inequitable offers.  
Furthermore, sellers state that it is fair for them to earn 59% of the sum “on the market” (FI tr.). In 
the NI tr., this figure drops to 52%. When we asked sellers to describe, in their own words, the criteria they 
used in order to formulate their offers, 50% of the sellers in the FI tr. stated that equity was their overriding 
concern,  with  payoff-concerns  being  expressed  by    35%  of  the  sample.  The  remaining  answers  were 
unclassifiable. In the NI treatment, on the other hand, 45% of the sellers expressed an overriding concern for 
payoffs (and only 10% for equity), with a threshold being used by 15% of the subjects, with 10% of the 
subjects stating that they were afraid of future lower offers, and with 10% stating they were guided by 
necessity (i.e., it was the last round). The remaining answers were unclassifiable. 
We turn our attention now to the buyers. We first asked them whether their offers would have been 
different had they been a seller instead of a buyer. 85% of the buyers in FI tr. and 90% in the NI tr. answered 
positively. When we asked them whether they thought they had been treated equitably by sellers, buyers in 
the FI tr. were equally split in their answers while, in the NI tr., 65% of the subjects answered negatively, 
though in this case equity was not readily ascertainable as buyers ignored the amount of points available to 
sellers.  
The fear of not winning anything played an important role in the choices of the buyers (70% of the 
buyers in the FI tr. and 60% in the NI tr. state so). We asked buyers to describe the criteria they had followed 
in order to decide which of the offers to accept. In the FI tr., 35% of the buyers expressed an overriding 
concern for payoff, and 20% for equity. The remainder stated that they were guided by necessity (“it was the 
last round”, 10%), by fear of future lower offers (10%), or by a threshold they had established (15%). The 
                                                
16 Cf. Appendix 5 for a translation of the debriefing.    24 
remaining answers were unclassifiable. In the NI tr., payoff was the overriding concern (45%), with equity 
playing only a minor role (10%), and with 15% of the subjects stating they used a threshold. The remaining 
answers were unclassifiable.   
 
5. Final remarks  
We have seen, in our reciprocity sessions, that if the game is played without any form of induced 
symmetry,  its  allocative  efficiency  level  is  very  modest:  such  result  is  marked  confirmation  of  the 
anthropological literature, especially Polanyi’s notion of symmetry, as well as Marcel Mauss’  description of 
gift-exchange as a fait social total (Mauss, 2002: 64).   
A criticality of our comparative institutional analysis, requiring further study, is the fiduciary aspect 
within different allocation modes. This is an element of overriding relevance in our reciprocity experiment, 
which however does not directly enter our market exchange design. Meeting this challenge would certainly 
help us in carrying out more  sensible comparisons across different interaction structures. 
Of the other possible improvements to the experimental design, one of the most relevant would be to try 
to mimic the “bi-directional” nature of the kula trade system. This would mean allowing the players to play 
more than once or introducing some form of bi-directionality. This could be implemented  by allowing 
players to send experimental points, not only forward, but also backwards. In this way, the institutional 
peculiarities of the kula arrangement would be better approximated  in the artificial setting of the laboratory 
and, from our theoretical departure point, this would increase the allocative efficiency.   25 
APPENDIX 1 
Instructions for the baseline experiment  
 (originally in Italian) 
 
Welcome and thank you for your participation. Please read the following instructions carefully.  From now until the end 
of the experiment, we kindly ask you not to communicate with your neighbours. If you have any doubts, at the end of 
the reading of the instructions, you can raise your hand, and we will answer  any questions you may want to ask.   
Your group consists of 10 people. At the beginning of the experiment, the computer will determine in a random fashion 
who the first player will be, and she will be the only one to know that she is the first. The first player will be given a 
certain amount of experimental points.  She can freely decide how much to withhold, and how much to send to a second 
player, randomly chosen by the computer among the remaining players. The first player opens the game and, hence, she 
has to send an amount of points greater than zero to player number 2.  The amount sent will be multiplied by two by the 
computer.  If we denote with x the amount that the first player decides to send to the second, the second player will thus 
have at his disposal 2x. The second player decides in his turn how much to withhold of this amount, and how much to 
send to a third player, randomly chosen by the computer.  This gets repeated until the game arrives at the tenth player. 
At each passage of points from one player to the other, the amount sent will be multiplied by two.  All your choices will 
be anonymous.  
The tenth and last player will not make any choice.  The amount that arrives to him, in fact, will be divided in equal 
shares among all the participants in the experiment. 
Your final pay off will be calculated as follows: 
Amount that you decide to withhold + 
Everything that reaches the 10
th player, divided by 10 
Your final payoff 
 
For your information, if all the players send all the amount at their disposal, the average final payoff will be about 800 
(in treatment 2: 1,400) points per each single player.  
The players from number 2 to number 9 have a further option: they can close the game. In this case, the closing player 
determines the end of the experiment. Thus, the remaining players are  not allowed to play. In the case of closure, the 
amount that the player who closes has at his disposal, is divided between himself and the players who played before 
him. The points withheld by the players who played before the closure are summed to this amount. The remaining 
players obtain nothing from the game.    26 
At the end of the experiment, you will be asked to answer a few short questions.  You will then be informed of your 
payoff. 
The experimental points you have gained will be converted into euros at the following exchange rate: 
1 experimental point =  1 eurocent (0.01 €). 
 
In thanks for your participation, you have already gained 200 points.  How much more you can earn, will depend on 
your choice, as well as on the choice of all the other  participants in the experiment.  
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APPENDIX 2 
Debriefing of the baseline experiment  
(originally in Italian) 
             
1)                       
Leaving aside the amount that you have kept for yourself, do you expect to receive back MORE or LESS than the 
amount you have sent?     
                       
2)                       
In your opinion, what is a fair share (in percentage terms) to send to the next player?             
                       
3)                       
Supposing that you were the first player, would your decision as to how much to withhold differ from the one you 
would make if  you were the ninth player?     
                       
4)                       
Which of following statements describes you best?                   
 
1. When I give a present to an acquaintance, I expect to receive a present back within a short  period of time;       
2. When I give a present, I do so regardless of the possibility of receiving one back;             
       
5)                       
What is your sex?                       
Female                       
Male                       
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APPENDIX 3 
 
Instructions for the pre-play communication experiment  
 (originally in Italian) 
 
The instructions were completely analogous to the ones reported in Appendix 1. At the end of the instructions, the 
following lines were added:  
 
You can now discuss for about five minutes among yourselves,  apropos the experiment.  To help you in the discussion, 
we suggest that you reflect upon the following points:  
 
1. According to you, if all the players send half of the sum they have available, how much will all participants win?  
2) Do you think that the introduction of a rule of behaviour among yourselves could be helpful in order to raise the 
payoffs of all participants?  
3) Do you think that the rule of behaviour that you have just discussed will be used by the players during the game? I 
would like to remind you that your choices will be anonymous and free.  
 
Debriefing 
(originally in Italian) 
 
The debriefing was completely analogous to the one reported in Appendix 2. The following question was added: 
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APPENDIX 4 
Instructions for the market exchange experiment 
(originally in Italian) 
[sentences added in the full-information treatment] 
 
Welcome and thanks for your participation.  Please read the following instructions carefully. From now until the end of 
the experiment, we kindly ask you not to communicate with your neighbours. If you have any doubts after  reading  the 
instructions,  please raise your hand, and one of us will answer  your questions.  
 
Your group consists of 10 people.  At the beginning of the experiment, the computer will determine in a random fashion 
your role in the game.  You can be either a seller or a buyer. Five of you will be sellers and five buyers.  If you are a 
seller, you will have a certain number of points at your disposal, and you will be able to decide how much to withhold 
of this sum, and how much to send to the anonymous buyers as an offer. Everything you send as a seller will be 
multiplied by two by the experimenter.  If you are a seller, you will also decide upon a division of the offered sum 
between yourself and the anonymous buyers. As the sellers send their offers, these will appear on the screen of all the 
buyers, who are free to choose, or not, one of the several offers. The total time available to sellers (to formulate an offer 
and its division) and to buyers (to accept, or not, one of the offers) is four [eight] minutes.   
 
If you are a buyer, and you accept an offer, this will disappear from the screen of all the other buyers.  In this case, you 
and the seller, whose offer you have accepted, should wait until the end of the experiment.   
 
If you are a buyer and you do not want to accept any of the offers received, you then simply wait until the four [eight] 
minutes are over, when the remaining sellers will formulate a new offer.  If within the four [eight] minutes, no buyer 
accepts an offer, in fact, the seller will formulate a new offer when  the four [eight] minutes are over, and everything 
will be repeated in the same way.  
 
The maximum number of offers for each seller is four. The total duration of the experiment is at maximum 16 [32] 
minutes.  
 
If no buyer accepts the proposal of a certain seller within the four possible rounds, this seller will lose the possibility to 
convert into euros the points he had decided to withhold in the last offer he had formulated.    30 
[The sum initially available to sellers will appear on the screen of the buyers].  
 
For those who formulate an offer which is accepted, and for the  person who accepts an offer, the  payoff is thus 
calculated: 
 
If you are a seller: 
 
Amount you withhold                                                    + 




If you are a buyer: 
 




If you formulate offers which are not accepted, and if you do not accept any offer, within the four possible rounds, your 
final payoff will be zero. At the end of the experiment, you will be required to answer a few questions. You will be then 
informed about your payoff. 
The experimental points you have gained will be converted into euros at the following exchange rate: 
1 experimental point = 0.01 eurocent 
 
You have already gained 200 experimental points just for your participation.   
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APPENDIX 5 
Debriefing of the market exchange experiment 
(originally in Italian) 
 
DEBRIEFING FOR SELLERS: 
With reference to the accepted offer, or to the last offer, in the case in which none of your offers were accepted, please 
answer the following questions: 
1.  If you were a buyer, would you have accepted the offer you formulated as a seller? 
2.  Do you think you were fair to the buyers? 
3.  Are you satisfied with your offer  choice? 
4.  If you had had more rounds available, would your choices have changed? 
5.  Can you briefly describe which criteria you have used in order to formulate your offer? 
6.  In your opinion, what is a fair division of the multiplied amount of points? 
7.  Did the fear of not winning anything play a role in your choices? 
8.  In which year were you born ? 
9.  What is your sex? 
 
DEBRIEFING FOR BUYERS: 
1.  Would your choices of offer have been different, had you been a seller? 
2.  Do you think you have been treated fairly by the seller? 
3.  Are you satisfied with the offer you have accepted? 
4.  Can you briefly describe on the basis of which criteria you decided which offer to accept? 
5.  In your opinion, what is a fair division of the multiplied amount of points? 
6.  Did the fear of not winning anything play a role in your choices? 
7.  In which year were you born ? 
8.  What is your sex? 
 
TAGS USED IN ORDER TO CODIFY SELLERS’ (BUYERS’) ANSWERS TO QUESTION NUMBER 5 (4): 
 
Necessity: The player explains that it was the last offer he thought he could profit from (or the fourth offer) and, hence, 
he was “forced to accept” (or “forced to send”, in the case of sellers).    32 
 
Payoff: In this case, buyers and sellers express an overriding concern for their material payoff.  
 
Equity: The buyer (or seller) expresses a clear concern about the equity of the division, although the interpretations of 
equity are quite different. For example, a number of sellers stated it was fair to divide the sum almost equally, with the 
greatest part for themselves, since they thought they were in a privileged position.  
 
Fear: The players express a feeling of fear or anxiety because they were not able to conclude one transaction.  
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FIGURE 2 
BASELINE EXPERIMENT: AVERAGE GIFT DECISIONS (ABSOLUTE FIGURES) 












































BASELINE EXPERIMENT: AVERAGE GIFT DECISIONS (AS PERCENTAGE OF THE 
ENDOWMENT) 
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FIGURE 4 





























REPEATED GAME: AVERAGE GIFT DECISIONS (ABSOLUTE FIGURES) 
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FIGURE 6 
PPC GAME: AVERAGE GIFT DECISIONS (ABSOLUTE FIGURES) 
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FIGURE 8 
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